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Abstract
Previous studies have discounted important factors and indirect channels that might
contribute to business cycle synchronization (BSC) in the EU. We estimate the effects of
market integration and economic policy coordination on bilateral business cycle correlations
over the period 1995-2012 using a simultaneous equations model that takes into accounts both
the endogenous relationships and unveils direct and indirect effects. The results suggest that
(i) trade and FDI have a pronounced positive effect on BCS, particularly between incumbent
and new EU members. (ii) Rising specialization does not decouple business cycles. (iii) The
decline of income disparities in EU27 contributes to BCS, as converging countries develop
stronger trade and FDI linkages. (iv) There is strong evidence that poor fiscal discipline
of EU members is a major impediment of business cycle synchronization. (v) The same
argument holds true for exchange rate fluctuations that hinder BCS, particularly in EU15.
Since BCS is a fundamental prerequisite and objective in an effective monetary union, the EU
has to promote market integration and strengthen the common setting of economic policies.
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1 Introduction
Business cycle synchronization (BCS) is an important prerequisite for the operation of a common
monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB). Only if business cycles of the Euro mem-
bers follow the same timing, direction and magnitude, can the ECB run an effective monetary
policy. This is relevant for both the current and the prospective members of the Eurozone.
The question arises whether increased market integration and common or strongly coordi-
nated economic policies promote BCS. The integration policy of the EU has led to a major
increase of intra-EU trade and FDI and partly higher specialization (Fontagne´ et al., 1998;
Badinger and Breuss, 2004; Pelkmans, 2006). While these linkages have become intensive in
the EU15 already during the 1990s, the new EU12 countries have developed their trade and
FDI relations with the EU15 fairly fast since the end of the 1990s, so that it has become their
principal trading partner and investor (see discussion in Section 5). The EU introduced the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), that requests EU members to coordinate their
monetary policies, and which was not only conceived as a pre-stage for EMU, but also intended
to facilitate trade. It adopted a common monetary policy for the Eurozone members and has
operated the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) intended to force budgetary discipline among
EU members, and to coordinate their fiscal policies. However, it was not always managed ac-
cording to its strict intention. Finally, the EU has aimed to reduce income disparities among its
members by its regional policy with some success.
The business cycle synchronization literature has argued, for similar or alternative set of (EU)
countries, that the factors involved by this integration policy and economic policy coordination
are determinants of the co-movement of business cycles. While there is an elaborated empirical
literature on the effects of trade, coordinated exchange rate policies and sectoral similarities on
BCS in the EU (see, for example Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Siedschlag and Tondl, 2011;
Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2011, among others), the empirical literature has largely neglected the
effects of FDI linkages, fiscal policy conditions, and income disparities. This study aims to fill
this gap in the literature by examining the effect of these factors, in addition to the ones already
established, as they are particularly important in the EU both as real achievements of integration
as well as EU policy targets. Policy makers should know to which extent FDI linkages determine
business cycle synchronization, whether the declared objective of EU’s regional policy, income
convergence, serves indirectly to achieve more synchronization, and if more coordinated fiscal
policies are desirable in this context.
We shall look at the synchronization of bilateral business cycles within the EU27. As an in-
dicator of business cycle synchronization the correlation of annualized quarterly HP-filtered real
GDP series over 5-year rolling windows is employed. Moreover, we include in our examination
the effect of bilateral trade and FDI, bilateral exchange rate volatility, bilateral differences in
government deficits, dissimilarities in economic specialization and income differences on business
cycle correlations. We conjecture that the relation between these factors and business cycle cor-
relations differ among countries in the EU15, EU15-newEU12 (i.e. the group comprising country
pairs between the incumbent EU15 members and the new EU12 members of the EU27), in the
Euro Area (EA), among the Core and Periphery of the EA, and among country pairs in the total
EU27. While in the EA and in EU15 we find fairly similar economies that have experienced
economic integration for a considerable amount of time, country pairs in EU15–newEU12 are
still less integrated and show considerable differences in economic development. The EU27 and
the EA are confronted with both similar and quite dissimilar economies. Our period of inves-
tigation covers business cycle correlations over the period 1995-2012 (14 observations of 5–year
rolling windows) that permits us to examine up to 325 cross-sections totalling 4550 observations
in the full sample based on a panel data set.
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The hypothesized relations between business cycles synchronization and the suggested ex-
planatory factors are assumed to be simultaneously/endogenously determined. For instance,
trade, on the one hand, will foster business cycle correlations but, on the other hand, more
synchronized business cycles can also foster trade between countries. This simultaneity may
arise as well with the additional endogenous variables employed in this study. To account for
the manifold and simultaneous relations, we use a model of simultaneous equations as employed
also in (Imbs, 2004, among others). This permits us to observe both the direct and indirect
effects of the explanatory variables. In contrast to the existing applications, we permit for a
more elaborated set of endogenous relations. Thus we can find additional interesting indirect
effects not yet discovered in the literature.
In our descriptive analysis we observe that business cycle synchronization has increased in
the EU27, however, it is still distinctly lower than that in the Euro Area and the EU15. Our
estimations show that the established trade integration and FDI linkages are key factors pro-
moting convergence of business cycles in the EU. However, we argue that only vertical FDI
contributes to BCS. The increasing specialization does not – in contrast to the previous studies
– decouple business cycles. The reduction of exchange rate volatility, partly by EMU member-
ship, leads to increased business cycle synchronization, and is the most important determinant
for the achieved high BCS in the EU15. In addition, exchange rate fluctuations are clearly
caused by individual business cycles and sector specific developments, as well as inflation and
credit differentials. The reduction of divergent fiscal policies has contributed to BCS in the
EU27, however, the newly arising great imbalances in government deficits, especially between
the peripheral and Eurozone core countries, have become a decoupling factor of business cycles
in the Eurozone. Interestingly, we find that governments budget deficits spreads are always
associated with large differences in government efficiency and with income gaps. In addition,
our results suggest that the reduction of income disparities in the EU27 is an important factor of
stronger BCS. Among the most important indirect effects are: (i) the effect of FDI on business
cycle synchronization via its stimulation of trade, (ii) the positive effect of trade contributing to
the reduction of income disparities, but the negative effect of government deficits on the later.
Thus, apparently, the EU’s integration policy fostering trade and FDI linkages has an important
impact on BCS. Coordinated monetary policies, rule bound, and strict fiscal policies promote
BCS. These policies therefore indirectly contribute to the functioning of the Eurozone with its
common ECB policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 proposes our hypotheses and discusses
the findings in the literature. Section 3 presents the model specification for our estimations.
Section 4 describes the variables, section 5 provides some empirical facts, section 6 presents the
results and section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical aspects, findings in the empirical literature and
hypotheses
We consider bilateral correlations of cyclical components of real GDP as an indicator of BCS in
the EU, and examine six potential determinants of BCS, namely, bilateral trade relations, FDI
linkages, monetary policy coordination, fiscal budget imbalances, differences in specialization,
and income disparities. We postulate that the factors determining BCS in the EU can also
explain each other, and thus a reverse causality with BCS is possible. Acknowledging this
endogeneity in a simultaneous equations model, we can posit the following additional hypotheses:
(i) we postulate that business cycle synchronization determinants can be potentially influenced
by other factors, that so far have not been explored rigorously, and (ii) that those determinants
3
can indirectly influence BCS via other channels.
Our first hypothesis is that trade integration serves as a transmission channel of business
cycles in the EU. We are interested to learn about the role of EU’s integration policy for BCS
in different parts of the EU. Frankel and Rose (1998) were among the first to argue that trade
linkages would result in increased BCS, Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Siedschlag and Tondl
(2011) and Rana et al. (2012) have verified the positive effect for the EU15, Gouveia and Correia
(2013) for the Euro Area 12 countries, and Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011) for the EU25 coun-
tries.1 The idea is that demand shocks are transmitted between countries via trade relations,
thus leading to a synchronized increase or decrease of business cycles.
We propose that trade itself is increased by fixed exchange rates (as argued in Frankel
and Rose, 1998, rooted in the ideas of McKinnon, 1963), through specialization (as found in
Siedschlag and Tondl, 2011, for EU15), FDI linkages and similarity in income levels. Trade
flows in turn could induce increased specialization of production, thus affecting business cycle
correlation indirectly. If stronger trade linkages are associated with increased inter-industry
specialization across countries, and industry-specific shocks are important in driving business
cycles, then business cycle synchronization might be expected to decrease (Kose et al., 2003).
Second, we consider that business cycle transmission may arise because of FDI linkages
between economies. FDI takes place due to different motives. It may be of the type of market-
seeking FDI in the EU. A financial services affiliate of a UK company operating in another
EU15 country or in the new EU12 may serve as a typical example. This type of FDI wishes
to exploit foreign markets in order to diversify the business. Companies may even search FDI
destinations with a different growth trend to diversify risk. Following Devereux and Yetman
(2010) we can argue that the performance of the affiliate will affect the mother company, either
through registered profits or losses which will lead to more or less investment activity at home.
A particular example is financial sector FDI. In case of a crisis and credit defaults in the host
economy, the mother company may encounter solvency problems which in turn affect the credit
volume in the home country (Kro¨ger et al., 2010). Thus FDI can propagate shocks. In summary,
with market seeking FDI, the business activity of the mother company will be affected by the
performance of the affiliate either with the same cyclical or anti-cyclical pattern, depending on
how synchronized economic growth is in the host economy. Consequently, market-seeking FDI
either promotes or hinders business cycle synchronization. The second major type of FDI is
vertical FDI. Here, a part of the production process is transferred to another country in concern
to save labour cost or other costs. The affiliate and the mother company are linked intensively
by trade flows of intermediates. For instance, during the recent economic crisis, the decline
in demand for automotives in Germany was translated into a falling demand for components
produced in German owned affiliates in Slovakia. Vertical FDI may thus constitute a major
channel for business cycle transmission. In a different vein, Backus et al. (1992) and Fidrmuc
et al. (2010) argue that FDI can be based on the comparative advantage of the host country,
and thus enforce specialization that ultimately decreases synchronization.
The empirical literature on the role of FDI – and not other financial linkages – on business
cycle synchronization remains limited and is rather inconclusive. Jansen and Stokman (2014)
examine the relationship between FDI and business cycle synchronization between 1982 and 2011
for eight industrialized countries, and find that more synchronized business cycles are associated
with stronger FDI relations over the period 1995–2011, but not before 1995. De´es and Zorell
(2012) show that it still remains difficult to disentangle a direct relationship between bilateral
FDI linkages and output correlations. While no such significant direct relationship exists for the
1Fidrmuc (2004) and Fontagne´ and Freudenberg (1999) test explicitly the impact of intra-industry trade to
promote BC synchronization.
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OECD countries, the relation becomes significantly positive for the EU25 countries. Imbs (2004,
2006) finds a positive direct relation between FDI linkages and output correlation in a worldwide
sample. In addition, Imbs (2004) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) find that FDI affects business
cycle synchronization indirectly via its effects on specialization. Last but not least, Hsu et al.
(2011) argues that FDI serves as a channel of international business cycle transmission that is
equally important as the channels of trade and monetary policy.2
Given that FDI has become important within the EU15 as well as between the EU15 and
the new EU12 countries, and that there is limited and inconclusive literature, we are interested
to examine whether FDI has an impact on business cycle correlations in different country blocks
of the EU, and thus whether integration policy which intends to promote European-wide in-
ternationalization of production sites serves BCS. Furthermore, since the literature does not
consider rigorously the potential endogeneity of FDI, and since we wish to disentangle between
the different types of FDI so as to shed light on the conflicting results in the literature, we
shall model the determinants of FDI and its indirect effects explicitly in our simultaneous equa-
tions approach. In particular we shall consider the effect of FDI on trade, specialization and
income disparities. As an indicator for FDI linkages we consider the sum of FDI stocks between
country-pairs related to their GDP.
Third, we wonder whether a common monetary policy, as within the Eurozone, or coordi-
nated monetary policies, if central banks pursue similar interest rate policies, as in the case of
prospective members which adhere to the ERM, enforce BCS or have decoupling effects. This
policy will introduce time-equivalent expansionary or restrictive effects on economic activity
and may lead to similar developments in business cycles. This effect was observed in the run-up
stage of EMU (Artis and Zhang, 1997). However, in the case of poor BCS, a common monetary
policy may even increase diverging trends, and an individual exchange rate and monetary policy
may better contribute to BCS (Siedschlag and Tondl, 2011). Moreover, as argued in McKinnon
(1963) and found in Rose (2000), with fixed exchange rates the indirect effect is that more stable
exchange rates promote trade. As an indicator for coordinated monetary policy we consider the
exchange rate volatility between country–pairs. Given that the members of the Eurozone have
grown in number over the past decade, we will benefit from significant variation in the data
both across our bilateral cross-sections as well as over time.
Fourth, a similar argument can be raised with fiscal policy conditions, common deficit rules
or common stimulation packages, as during the recent economic crisis and the common con-
solidation efforts thereafter. This may foster BCS, but less fiscal policy differences across EU
countries may also serve to bring diverging business cycles closer to each other, a point made
e.g. by Clark and van Wincoop (2001). In practice we find a significant degree of variation in
fiscal policies among EU members despite the SGP. Thus we are interested in whether similar
or different fiscal conditions contribute to BCS in the EU. We consider the bilateral difference
in budget deficits. Empirical studies generally find that, fiscal policy coordination or similar
2Studies that use alternative measures of financial integration provide conflicting results. For instance, Jones
and Witte (2011) find that financial integration has a significant negative effect on business cycle synchronization
between the new member states of the EU and the euro area; Kalemli-Ozcan and Papaioannou (2009) find that
a higher degree of financial integration is associated with less synchronized output cycles for a sample of 20
developed countries over the period 1978-2007; Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) based on a panel data set for 18
rich economies over the 1978 to 2006 period identify a strong negative effect of banking integration on output
synchronization, conditional on global shocks and country-pair heterogeneity; Cerqueira and Martins (2009) using
data for 20 OECD countries from 1970 to 2002 find a negative and significant effect of financial openness on BCS.
On the other hand, Akin (2012) who examines the determinants of real GDP correlations for 51 countries including
27 emerging markets over the period 1970-2008, finds no significant effect on business cycle synchronization on
average; a negative effect for developed country pairs, and developed and emerging country pairs; and a positive
effect on BCS for emerging markets.
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budget conditions, based on alternative proxies, generally lead to increased business cycle syn-
chronization in the EU (see, for instance, Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Darvas et al., 2005;
Camacho et al., 2006; Artis et al., 2008; Furceri, 2009; Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2011; Hauge and
Skulevold, 2012).
Fifth, in accordance with the arguments of Kenen (1969), the literature on business cycle
synchronization has also highlighted the importance of sectoral similarity (e.g. Imbs, 2004, 2006;
Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Inklaar et al., 2008). Countries with similar economic structures
are more likely to be affected by similar demand shocks, while countries with dissimilar struc-
tures will watch a different timing of demand shocks. Sectoral dissimilarity between countries
is supposed to result in different business cycles. As found in Siedschlag and Tondl (2011),
specialization has also an indirect positive effect via trade. In this study we also explore the
indirect effect of specialization on BCS via the FDI channel.
Finally, we are interested in seeing whether income differences in the EU have an effect on
business cycle synchronization. Countries with very different per capita incomes are likely to
have different economic policies and different institutional frameworks. Empirically, this point
has hardly been investigated. Louis and Tozman (2010) found that countries in the same income
group are more likely to show similar business cycles.3 Since the reduction of income disparities
is a declared objective of the EU pushed by its heavily funded regional policy, we are interested
in exploring whether the reduction of income disparities in the EU also contributes to business
cycle synchronization. Furthermore, we expect income disparities to determine FDI flows, trade
intensity, specialization and budget deficit differentials, and thus to produce indirect effects on
BCS. Importantly, we consider the endogeneity of income differences explicitly in our model,
and examine in a Heckscher-Ohlin spirit whether trade reduces income disparities and what is
the role of mounting budget deficit conditions among EU countries.
The effects of the direct and indirect channels will be evaluated according to the methodology
discussed in the following section.
3 Model specification
We build on Imbs (2004) and follow Siedschlag and Tondl (2011) and estimate a system of
simultaneous equations based on a panel data set which, however, is far more complex than
that in previous studies. The bilateral correlation of business cycles is explained by six variables
which are all considered to be endogenous, so that each is modelled within the system separately.
In this way we can examine a variety of diverse indirect effects, that have been so far overlooked
in the literature. Since each variable is itself explained by two to six other endogenous variables
plus exogenous variables, the variables are very well defined by this complexity. This is confirmed
by a high explanatory power of the estimations, as we shall see below.
We estimate the proposed effects in the following simultaneous equations model based on
a panel data set in different EU samples, namely, the EU15, EA11, Core Vs Periphery, EU15-
newEU12 and the full sample of EU27.
3Recently, Canova et al. (2012) examined whether three institutional changes (the Maastricht Treaty, the
creation of the ECB and the Euro changeover) affect business cycles in Europe and found that the process of real
convergence predates the three institutional changes
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CORRYijt = α1FDIijt + α2TRADEijt + α3GOVDEFijt + α4EXCHijt + α5SPECijt
+α6DGDPPCijt + α7I1ijt + µ1ij + λ1t + τ1ijt + ε1ijt (1)
FDIijt = β1CORRYijt + β2TRADEijt + β3SPECijt + β4DGDPPCijt + β5I2ijt
+µ2ij + λ2t + τ2ijt + ε2ijt (2)
TRADEijt = γ1CORRYijt + γ2EXCHijt + γ3SPECijt + γ4FDIijt + γ5DGDPPCijt
+γ6I3ijt ++µ3ij + λ3t + τ3ijt + ε3ijt (3)
SPECijt = δ1TRADEijt + δ2FDIijt + δ3I4ijt + µ4ij + λ4t + τ4ijt + ε4ijt (4)
GOVDEFijt = ζ1CORRYijt + ζ2DGDPPCijt + ζ3I5ijt + µ5ij + λ5t + τ5ijt + ε5ijt (5)
EXCHijt = η1CORRYijt + η2GOVDEFijt + η3DGDPPCijt + η4SPECijt + η5I6ijt + µ6ij
+λ6t + τ6ijt + ε6ijt (6)
DGDPPCijt = θ1TRADEijt + θ2GOVDEFijt + θ3FDIijt + θ4I7ijt + µ7ij + λ7t + τ7ijt + ε7ijt.(7)
where i, j and t are the index country pairs (i, j) in period t, and ε is the error term. Vectors Ikij ,
where k = 1, . . . , 7, include the exogenous variables that are employed in the system to achieve
identification, and µkij , λkt and τkijt, where k = 1, . . . , 7, are the country–pair fixed–effects, time
fixed–effects and country–pair time-trends, respectively.4
As it is often unrealistic to expect the equation errors in our system to be uncorrelated, we
employ a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system approach proposed by Zellner (1962).
The SUR model is estimated using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method, which
is essentially a two-step procedure; in the first step we estimate the parameters of our system by
ordinary least squares, and use the residuals obtained from this step to estimate the disturbance
terms’ variances and covariances in the second step.
CORRYijt is the Fisher’s z-transformation of correlations of annualized quarterly HP filtered
log real GDP series between country i and j. The Fisher’s z-transformation is used in order to
achieve normality in the distribution of the correlation coefficients, as the (Pearson) correlation
coefficients are bounded at [-1,1] (see Inklaar et al., 2008). FDIijt denotes FDI stocks between
country-pairs related to the sum of their GDP; TRADEijt is the external trade between the two
countries related to the sum of their GDP; GOVDEFijt is the differential in general government
deficit between the two countries as an indicator for fiscal policy coordination; EXCHijt refers
to the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate as an indicator for the presence or absence of a
common monetary policy regime; SPECijt is an index of similarity in sectoral structures between
country–pairs , and DGDPPCijt refers to bilateral differences in economic development.
In addition to the principal equation, the system consists of six auxiliary equations which
capture the simultaneity contained in equation (1). In equation (2), bilateral FDI is explained by
CORRYijt, the correlation of business cycles, TRADEijt, the bilateral trade share, SPECijt,
differences in specialization, DGDPPCijt, the differences in per capita income, and a set of
exogenous variables among them wage differences (WAGE). This should permit us to find out
to what extent FDI follows motives of risk diversification (CORRY ), of comparative advantages
(SPEC), and whether FDI goes to differently developed markets (DGDPPC, WAGE).
Equation (3) explains trade by the correlation of business cycles, exchange rate volatility,
similarity of economic structures, intensity of FDI linkages between partners, differences in
economic development and a set of exogenous variables, among them, institutional variables
4For the system to be identified it is necessary that for each endogenous variable in an equation an equal number
of exogenous variables differently from the exogenous in the same equation is present in the other equations. Thus
each equation requires a different set of exogenous variables (Wooldridge, 2006).
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differences in regulatory quality, REG, and rule of law, ROL. This should permit us to exam-
ine whether common monetary policy strengthens trade flows (negative coefficient of EXCH),
whether trade is of inter– or intra– industry type (positive or negative coefficient of SPEC and
DGDPPC), and whether FDI is enforcing trade so that we can assume the presence of vertical
FDI.
Equation (4) explains specialization by the bilateral trade share, intensity of FDI linkages,
and a set of exogenous variables, among them the sum of per capita income level of the partners,
SGDPPC, and the differential of institutional quality indicators (POL, REG, ACC). We
assume that specialization increases with trade and FDI intensity, and that it mirrors differences
in economic development.
Equation (5) posits that government deficit differentials are explained by the correlation
of business cycles, differences in economic development, DGDPPC, and exogenous variables,
among them, the long–term interest rate differentials, LINT , and the differentials in government
efficiency, GOV EFF . We postulate that large differences in fiscal conditions in the EU are
invoked by different business cycles, appear between partners with different lending costs, they
are more pronounced with unequally developed EU countries and with larger differences in
government efficiency. In other words, we expect poorer EU member states to have higher
government deficits.
Moving to Equation (6), the volatility of the bilateral exchange rates is determined by the
correlation of business cycles, specialization, government deficit differentials, differences in eco-
nomic development and a set of exogenous variables, namely, inflation differentials, INFL,
short–term interest rate differentials, SINT , and domestic credit differentials, DOMCRED.
We expect that larger exchange rate volatility differentials appear between country–pairs with
de–synchronized business cycles, increased specialization, with larger differences in government
budget deficit, inflation, interest rates and domestic credit, and with differences in economic
development.
Finally, Equation (7) describes differences in economic development by the bilateral trade
and FDI intensity, government deficit differentials, income disparities and a set of exogenous
variables containing institutional differences (POL, ROL, CORRUPT ).
4 Data and variables definition
We use national level macroeconomic data from various sources, among them, Eurostat, Ameco
database, IMF, WDI and national central banks over the period 1995–2012. All variables are
bilateral and are constructed as five year rolling windows for the following groups: EU27, EU15,
EU15-newEU12, EA11 and Core Vs Periphery. The detailed definition and sources of variables,
descriptive statistics and the country groupings used in this study are given in Tables 1, 2 and
3, respectively.
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Table 2 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
Financial linkages between two partners are represented as the sum of bilateral assets (FDI
stocks) related to the sum of GDP of the two countries, a measure also applied in Fidrmuc et al.
(2010) and Garc´ıa-Herrero and Ruiz (2008). FDI was the most challenging variable because of
the necessity to work with bilateral FDI stocks. We used in general data on FDI outward stocks.
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Since the data has missing data points due to confidentiality requirements, we had to interpolate
and extrapolate the data starting from the trend observed in the series and extending according
to the structure of higher level aggregates.
Among the various measures for bilateral trade linkages proposed in the literature we employ
bilateral trade flows related to the sum of the partners’ GDP, as in Frankel and Rose (1998),
Fidrmuc (2004) and Siedschlag (2010), which we find more convincing than the measure relating
bilateral trade of the partners to total worldwide trade of both partners as suggested in Imbs
(2004) and Fidrmuc et al. (2010). Having the GDP sum in the denominator establishes a
relationship with the size of the economies, while this would not necessarily hold when the
measure of bilateral trade is related to the total trade volume.
For specialization, as in Imbs (2004) or Siedschlag and Tondl (2011), we use an indicator
proposed by Krugman (1991). Our specialization index focuses on specialization in manufac-
turing based on 23 manufacturing industrial branches. Since we regard trade in goods it seems
logical to base the indicator for specialization on manufacturing and not other branches.5
5 Empirical facts
Before turning our attention to the estimation results, we discuss the evolution of the main
variables in the different country groupings, namely, EU27, EU15, EU15–newEU12, EA11 and
Core Vs Periphery, in Figures 1 - 7.
Figure 1 shows the development of correlations in cyclical components of real GDP. Evidently,
correlations are the highest in the EA11 group, followed by EU15 and Core Vs Periphery,
while the lowest correlations are observed in the EU15–newEU12 and EU27 groups. Business
cycle correlations reached unprecedented levels across all groups during the global financial and
economic crisis of 2007-2009, with EA11 even reaching a correlation of almost 0.6 in 2006–2010.
Overtime, business cycle correlations reveal a positive trend with a couple of declines in 2000–
2004 and in 2007–2011. The decline of correlations in the 2000–2004 and 2007–2011 appears as
a distinct feature with all countries. A look at the data shows that, growth after the 2001–2002
stagnation accelerated with a different timing, stagnated in some countries altogether and saw a
second interim stagnation in a few of them. This explains the drop in business cycle correlations
in the observation 2000–2004. Another interesting feature is the decoupling of correlations
between EA11, Core Vs Periphery and EU15, and EU27 and EU15-newEU12 in 2008–2012 due
to the European Debt crisis that affected mostly the peripheral Eurozone countries. Finally, the
increase of business cycle synchronization in the EU27 from virtually nothing in 1995–1999 to
around 0.3 is particularly noteworthy. Overall, business cycle synchronization increased since
the introduction of the euro across all groups in the EU.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 2 shows that bilateral trade intensity (bilateral trade as share of both countries’
GDP) is twice and thrice as high in the EU15 and EA11, respectively, than that in the EU27,
and trade intensity between EU15–newEU12 partners are only one fifth of that in the EU15.
Trade intensity shows a constant upward trend in all subgroups with similar growth rates, with
the exception of the Core Vs Periphery, EU15 and EA11 since 2005–2009 where these groups
experienced a decline of trade intensity.
5Other authors regard specialization with respect to all economic sectors, e.g. Siedschlag (2010) considers 6
sectors of the whole economy, Clark and van Wincoop (2001) uses an indicator with 8 non-manufacturing and 8
manufacturing industries.
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[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 3 shows that bilateral FDI linkages (bilateral FDI stocks as a share of both countries’
GDP) have rapidly increased across all groups in the period of concern. The increase was more
pronounced in the EA11, EU15 and the Core vs Periphery groups than that in the EU27 and
EU15–newEU12. Once again, FDI linkages are stronger among the EA11, EU15 and Core vs
Periphery countries, being more than 5 times higher in the EU15 member states than those in
the EU15–newEU12 members.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Consequently, we see that, in total, EU27 bilateral trade and FDI linkages vary to a consid-
erable extent, comprising country pairs with intensive and very weak linkages.
Figure 4 illustrates the differential in government deficits in absolute terms, our indicator
of dissimilarity of fiscal policies. A high differential indicates poor fiscal policy conditions and
substantial differences in compliance with the SGP. The evolution of these series is rather id-
iosyncratic across country groups. In particular, differences in budget deficits have increased
throughout the period in the Core Vs Periphery, EU15 and EA11, with a short period of sta-
bility between 1997–2001 and 1999–2003, i.e., the introductory stage of the Euro. The increase
in budget deficit differences in the Core Vs Periphery are the most pronounced, reaching a
peaking in 2008–2012 of around 6.5%. In contrast, differences in budget deficits have increased
between country pairs of EU15–newEU12 and EU27 until 1997–2001, and have been followed
by a declining trend, reaching a minimum during during 2003–2007. After that, budget deficit
differences for these groups have increased and seem to have been stabilized by the end of our
sample. Finally, the only period where differences in the budget deficits were almost identical
across all groups of countries, was during the 2002–2006 period with a value of around 3%.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
According to Figure 5, exchange rate volatility has followed a declining trend in the EU
until 2003–2007, which was reversed afterwards. The only exception is in the case of the Core
Vs Periphery and EA11 countries, wherein exchange rate volatility was eliminated with the
introduction of the common currency. Interestingly, exchange rate volatility is three times
higher in the EU15–newEU12 countries than that in the EU15 over the period 1995–1999, but
only around two times higher since the 2000–2004.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Based on Figure 6, manufacturing specialization has seen interesting changes in the EU
overtime. Manufacturing specialization has declined in the early part of our sample across all
groups, and increased sharply, after a period of stability, in the recent period. This indicates
an important structural change across the EU. First the old specialization was dissolved, then
countries have specialized in new productions.6
[Insert Figure 6 here]
6As an alternative measure, we have employed a specialization indicator with 6 industries including both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries based on data collected from Eurostat. Based on that indicator,
specialization is generally less pronounced.
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Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the differences in per capita income. Income differences in the
EU15–newEU12 and the EU27 have declined in the period of concern, whereas there was a slight
increase in the remaining groups.7
[Insert Figure 7 here]
6 Results
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the EU27 as a whole, EU15, and EU15–newEU12,
while Table 5 for the EA11 and Core Vs Periphery.
[Insert Table 4 here]
[Insert Table 5 here]
We find a positive and significant effect of trade and specialization on business cycle synchro-
nization, with the former effect being the most important one throughout the EU. In particular,
the effect of trade on BCS is more pronounced within the Eurozone (Core Vs Periphery and
EA11) than that within the EU15–newEU12, EU15 or even the EU27 as a whole.
The impact of trade linkages on business cycle synchronization confirms the results found
in the literature for the EU15 (e.g. Clark and van Wincoop 2001; Siedschlag and Tondl 2011;
Rana et al. 2012), EA12 (e.g. Gouveia and Correia 2013), EU25 (Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2011),
OECD countries (e.g. Fidrmuc 2004) and worldwide samples (e.g. Imbs 2004; Caldero´n 2003).
Here we provide additional evidence for the EU and particularly for the Euro area.8
The equation on TRADE reveals that economies with more synchronized business cycles
and intensive FDI linkages trade more with each other. The estimation results show that FDI
has a high trade enhancing effect in the EU, particularly between the EU15–newEU12, while it is
disproportionately low in the Core Vs Periphery. This indicates that vertical FDI (outsourcing) is
particularly important between EU15–newEU12 countries, but that market seeking FDI prevails
in Core Vs Periphery. In each group, several interesting trade patterns appear. Trade is clearly
focusing on countries with equal income levels (negative coefficient on DGDPPC) and equal
regulatory frameworks; only in the group of EU15–newEU12 trade arises between countries
with higher income gaps. Furthermore, specialization – which emerges in all samples between
equally developed countries (positive coefficient on SGDPPC in SPEC equation) - contributes
to the intensive trade linkages between high income countries. Finally, we see that exchange
rate volatility discourages trade significantly between EU15–newEU12.9
In our system of simultaneous equations we can observe the indirect effects of the channels
and determinants of BCS. With respect to trade, we see that it affects FDI, specialization and
income disparities (see equations FDI, SPEC and DGDPPC in Tables 4 and 5). Thus, we
find indirect effects of trade via FDI, specialization and income disparities. Trade increases
specialization in practically all samples, and thus re-enforces the positive effect of specialization
on BCS across almost all groups. On the one hand, trade leads to a reduction of income
disparities in the EU27 and the Euro Area, and thus indirectly contributes to BCS. On the other
hand, trade enhances income disparities in the EU15–newEU12, while no significant effects of
trade on income disparities in the EU15 could be identified.
7Note that this picture remains very similar with the use of GDP per capita in PPP as the basis of construction
of the indicator.
8This also explains that, in the recent economic crisis, the Euro area members and in particular the peripheral
ones suffered immediately from declining export demand and synchronous output decline.
9The result corresponds to Frankel and Rose (1998), who suggest that decreasing exchange rate volatility
encourages trade, and argue that this is indicative of the endogeneity between trade and currency areas.
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[Insert Table 6 here]
The positive coefficient of sectoral specialization is opposite to the findings elsewhere in the
literature, e.g. Imbs (2004) and Siedschlag (2010), who find a negative relationship, and Clark
and van Wincoop (2001), who find no significant relationship. One explanation for this could be
the difference in the specialization indicator employed. Our indicator is based on 23 manufac-
turing branches whereas the other studies use a sectoral decomposition at a higher aggregation
level.10 Thus despite specialization, the dominant products produced in the two specialized
countries may be complementary so that specialization does not imply specific demand shocks.
Another explanation is that our investigation covers more recent data than those in the above
studies.11 Our indicator of specialization indicates increasing manufacturing specialization in
the most recent years of our sample (see Section 5). Nevertheless the size of the direct positive
effect of specialization on BCS is much smaller than that of trade. The positive effect of spe-
cialization on BCS is more pronounced in the EU27, EU15 and in the EA11 than that in the
Core Vs Periphery, while no significant effect of specialization on BCS in the EU15-newEU12
could be identified.
The equation on SPEC provides information on the determinants of specialization in the
EU. Most pronounced is the effect of FDI linkages on specialization. We find a positive effect
of FDI on specialization in practically all samples, except in the Core Vs Periphery. Thus FDI
mostly leads to restructuring and development of comparative advantages to a larger extent
than trade does. In particular, in the EU15–newEU12, FDI is a strong driver of increasing
specialization. Specialization emerges between equally developed countries (positive coefficient
of SGDPPC) in practically all samples, but also between countries with institutional disparities
(positive coefficient of ACC). The later result corresponds to the findings of Imbs (2004) among
others. Our finding suggests that new patterns of specialization have appeared.
We find that specialization also has indirect effects via FDI, trade (a result which is in line
with Siedschlag and Tondl, 2011), and exchange rate volatility (see Tables 4 and 5). Specializa-
tion triggers FDI (except in the Core Vs Periphery) and thus also results in a negative indirect
effect (not significant though in EU15–newEU12) on BCS. Furthermore, since specialization
results in almost all samples in increased trade (except for EU15–newEU12) we observe a pos-
itive indirect effect of specialization on BCS via trade. Since specialization leads to a need of
exchange rate flexibility in EU27 and EU15, it also reduces indirectly BCS. In summary, when
we consider both the direct and indirect effects, specialization contributes positively to BCS (see
Table 6).
With respect to bilateral FDI linkages, we find across almost all EU groups a negative effect
on BCS, – with EU15–newEU12 the coefficient of FDI is not significant (see Tables 4 and 5).
This suggests decoupling effects arising from FDI in the EU. If one considers the pure direct
effect, then FDI linkages do not lead to enforcing business cycle spillovers between the two
partners, rather the oppositve. FDI holdings may thus smoothen demand shocks. The effect is
particularly high in the Euro area and the EU15. How can we explain this decoupling effect?
Looking at the auxiliary equation that explains bilateral FDI stocks, we observe a significantly
negative coefficient of business cycle correlations in explaining FDI stocks in almost all samples
10Clark and van Wincoop (2001) use 8 manufacturing sectors and 8 non-manufacturing branches and Siedschlag
(2010) uses 6 branches of the total economy for the specialization indicator. As mentioned in section 5, we used
also an alternative specialization indicator covering 6 manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors for robustness
checks. In this case we found an insignificant coefficient of specialization. However, the specialization variable
based on all sectors of the economy and not only on manufacturing sectors resulted in less clear results in the
auxiliary equations and an unsatisfactory fit of the specialization equation.
11Clark and van Wincoop (2001) look at the period 1970-1993, Siedschlag (2010) investigates the period 1990-
2003.
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(except EU15–newEU12). This indicates that FDI searches destinations which do not exhibit the
same growth path; in other words, much of this FDI searches to diversify risk and benefit from
differently growing markets. It appears in almost all groups that FDI searches destinations with
a different income level (positive coefficient of DGDPPC) but also similarly developed markets
(negative coefficient on wage disparity). Between EU15–newEU12, in contrast, FDI searches
only equally developed markets (negative coefficient of DGDPPC and wage gap). Evidently,
FDI linkages are higher between countries with strong established trade links, as the positive
coefficient of trade suggests.
Furthermore, we find a positive coefficient of specialization on FDI across all samples. This
suggests that, in contrast to the market-seeking FDI, risk–diversifying FDI also follows compet-
itive advantages of countries in certain sectors. This type of FDI would represent vertical FDI
where a part of the production is transferred to another country. The fact that a part of FDI
represents vertical FDI is confirmed by the consistently positive coefficient of FDI in both the
TRADE and SPEC equation. Vertical FDI increases trade flows and enforces specialization -
the latter result is also found in Imbs (2004). This is particularly pronounced in EU15–newEU12.
Thus we find positive indirect effects of FDI on BCS. Attracting intermediary products, FDI
serves particularly in the EU periphery to achieve BCS with the EU. Looking at Table 6, we see
that the indirect effects of FDI suggest a net positive effect of FDI in EU27, EU15, in EA11,
Core vs Periphery, and the most pronounced one in EU15–newEU12.
Several empirical studies found a positive direct impact of FDI on BCS (Jansen and Stok-
man, 2014; De´es and Zorell, 2012; Hsu et al., 2011; Imbs, 2004). While Jansen and Stokman
(2014) looks at a set of 8 advanced OECD countries, Imbs (2004) covers 24 developed and de-
veloping countries and De´es and Zorell (2012) 25 EU countries. In contrast, Garc´ıa-Herrero
and Ruiz (2008) investigate the BCS of Spain with 109 countries worldwide and find a negative
relationship. The studies finding a positive coefficient of FDI cover either older time periods
and different samples than our study (Imbs 2004: 1980-2000, Jansen and Stokman 2014: 1982-
2011) or have a simpler econometric specification which does not account for the endogeneity
of FDI (Jansen and Stokman, 2014; De´es and Zorell, 2012). Furthermore, none of these studies
consider the potentially important indirect effects of FDI via trade, specialization and income
disparities simultaneously. Therefore their results are not directly comparable to ours. Since we
use a more suitable indicator for FDI linkages, account for the endogeneity of FDI and consider
various potential indirect effects, we think that our results are more robust than those suggested
by De´es and Zorell (2012) for EU25.12 The only exception is the study (Hsu et al., 2011), who
examine the indirect effects of FDI via trade and specialization in a panel of 15 OECD countries
and find that FDI promotes BCS. However, the authors do not examine the potential indirect
effects via income disparities, as in our study, neither analyse the net effects, nor focusing only
on EU countries.
Turning our attention to the differences in governments budget deficits, we find a negative
effect across all samples, except for the EU15, where the coefficient is insignificant. The negative
effect of disparities in government fiscal policies on BCS is particularly strong in the EU15–
newEU12. The effect is of similar magnitude within the EU27 and the Eurozone, while between
the Core and the Periphery is more pronounced. These results are in line with previous studies
that document that, fiscal policy coordination or better fiscal conditions, based on different
proxies, generally lead to increased business cycle synchronization in the EU (see, for instance,
Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Darvas et al., 2005; Camacho et al., 2006; Artis et al., 2008;
12De´es and Zorell (2012) use the absolute volume of bilateral FDI stocks without relating it to the GDP of the
countries involved, as an indication for financial linkages. Since the same volume of FDI can represent either strong
FDI linkages existing between small economies, or weak FDI linkages between large economies, this measure is
distorted.
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Furceri, 2009; Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2011; Hauge and Skulevold, 2012). Thus there is strong
evidence that the initially recorded declining deficit disparities prior to the global economic crisis
have fostered BCS, while the increasing deficit disparities in the course of the economic crisis
weakened BCS.
The auxiliary equation GOVDEF reveals interesting factors that determine differences in
fiscal policies. First, the partly negative coefficient of CORRY suggests that differences in fiscal
policies are caused by divergent business cycles, and are therefore a consequence of revenue
shortfalls or active fiscal adjustment policies. Second, it appears throughout, that differences in
government deficits are related to income disparities and dissimilarities in government efficiency.
Evidently the different economic and institutional development is an important reason of the
mounting disparities in government deficits. Third, the positive coefficient of LINT in the
EU15 and the Eurozone shows that, also rising interest disparities are responsible for mounting
disparities in budgetary deficits. Note that the coefficient of LINT is negative in the EU15–
newEU12 and EU27 as a whole. Here, budgetary disparities have developed despite falling
interest rate differentials. Government deficit disparities not only reduce directly BCS, but also
indirectly, via increased exchange rate volatility in the EU27. The effect is less clear in the
EU15 and EU15–newEU12. Equally important is the indirect negative impact of budget deficits
on BCS via income disparities. Higher deficits lead to an increase in income disparities in all
groups (see equation DGDPPC), and thus indirectly BCS is reduced in the EU27 and EU15–
newEU12. The net effect of disparities in government deficits remains negative in the EU27 and
EU15–newEU12, however, it becomes positive in the Eurozone as the slight increase in income
disparities in the Eurozone does not hinder BCS (see Table 6).
Overall, the results that diverging fiscal policies have discouraged BCS are in line with Darvas
et al. (2005), who finds that fiscal convergence lead to more synchronized business cycles in 21
OECD countries over the period 1963–2003. In contrast, we cannot confirm the results of Clark
and van Wincoop (2001), who do not find any significant effect of differences in fiscal policy on
BCS in the EU15 between 1981 and 1997.
Exchange rate volatility is an important negative factor impeding BCS particularly in the
EU15 and also in the EU27 as a whole, which is in line with Siedschlag and Tondl (2011).
This does, however, not appear in the EU15–newEU12, where the coefficient is insignificant.
These results suggest that, exchange rate alignments within the latter group may serve as an
adjustment instrument. As long as such adjustment via exchange rate flexibility is required by
an EU member, it will not discourage BCS and should be maintained. Whether joining the
Euro thus needs prudent reflection. Since exchange rate volatility can by definition not occur in
the EMU, this factor was obviously not included in the estimations with the Eurozone samples.
In the auxiliary equation on EXCH we find that the need for exchange rate volatility arises
in all groups: EU15, EU15–newEU12, and EU27 as a consequence of poor BCS. Exchange rate
volatility is always observed with high specialization between country pairs, suggesting that
flexible exchange rates are used to adjust for sector–specific shocks. Furthermore, exchange
rate volatility is always caused by inflation differentials. In the EU15 and EU27, we also find
that volatility corresponds to interest differentials. Moreover, it corresponds to high income
disparities and government deficit differences in the EU15–newEU12 and EU27 as a whole. In
contrast, exchange rate volatility is observed with countries showing small income differences in
the EU15, suggesting that exchange rates are used to a large extent to counteract poor BCS and
sector–specific shocks. Since the EXCH equation still showed a poor fit, despite this variety
of factors in the sample of EU15–newEU12, we extended the specification of EXCH and found
that, differentials in domestic credit activity can very well explain exchange rate volatility in this
group. Mounting credit lending in the newEU12 has resulted in more exchange rate volatility.
Although there is no statistically significant direct negative effect of exchange rate volatility on
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BCS in the EU15–newEU12, we find an indirect negative effect via trade in EU15–newEU12
(see Table 6).
Moreover, our estimates reveal a statistically significant negative effect of income differences
on BCS in the EU15–newEU12 and EU27 as a whole, which is in line with the few findings in
the literature on the effects of income levels on BCS (e.g. Louis and Tozman, 2010). Thus the
decline of income disparities in these groups helped to synchronize business cycles. In contrast,
the slightly increasing income disparities in the EA11 and Core vs Periphery did not harm BCS.
We find that income differences produce several indirect effects on BCS (see Table 6): via FDI
and trade which are encouraged or discouraged by income differences, government deficits and
exchange rate volatility. In summary, income differences produce a net negative effect on BCS
across all samples.
The auxiliary equation explaining income disparities (DGDPPC) reveals further interesting
regularities. In particular, we find a negative relationship with disparities in government deficits
and institutions - be it rule of law, corruption or political stability – across all samples. Thus
institutional upgrading and strict coordination of budgetary policies seems to be a prerequisite
so as to decrease income disparities in the EU. In addition, we find that poor trade relations
characterize countries with income disparities in the Eurozone and the EU27. In the EU15–
newEU12, in contrast, countries with poor FDI relations show high income disparities.
If we consider both the direct and indirect effects of our variables on BCS together, i.e., the
net effects reported in Table 6, we can conclude that trade and specialization lead to more busi-
ness cycle synchronization in the EU, while differences in income and exchange rate volatility,
have decoupling compound effects on business cycle synchronization across the EU.13 Interest-
ingly, the net effect of FDI on BCS is positive and robust across all EU groups, and in general,
of equal or even greater importance than that of trade. This result suggest a call for additional
research that takes into account FDI into the macroeconomic modeling of BCS in the EU, as
also suggested by Hsu et al. (2011). Last but not least, the net effects of government deficit
disparities on BCS is negative in the EU as a whole, in the EU15 and EU15–newEU12, due
to dominance of the direct effects of fiscal disparities on BCS, while in the Eurozone, the net
effect of fiscal divergencies on BCS is positive, because of the dominance of the indirect effect
of GOVDEF via income differences over the direct effect of fiscal divergencies on BCS. The
latter results is plausible, as the countries who suffered the most pronounced reduction in their
standards of living from austerity measures implemented in the recent years, are the beleaguered
southern Eurozone countries. For instance, GDP per capita declined cumulatively by 22% in
Greece between 2008 and 2012, while in Germany it increased cumulatively by 4.4% during
the same period, according to data from the AMECO database, thereby intensifying income
disparities between strong and weaker Eurozone members.
7 Conclusions
Business Cycle Synchronization (BCS) is an important prerequisite and objective for the smooth
functioning of the common monetary policy in the Eurozone. The aim of this study is to examine
whether market integration policies and common or coordinated economic policies can improve
business cycle synchronization. To achieve that, we employ a system of simultaneous equations
and take into account additional indirect channels and factors that could potentially affect
business cycle synchronization, that were largely overlooked in the existing literature.
Thus, the contribution of our study is twofold. First, we examine the direct, indirect and
13The only exception is EA11, wherein we observe a net, albeit small, negative effect of trade on BCS due to
the dominance of the negative indirect of trade on BCS via FDI over the direct effect of trade on BCS.
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overall effects of integration and coordinated economic policies on BCS, by including determi-
nants in our estimations which have been largely discounted in previous EU studies. Second,
we extend the well established simultaneous equations approach used in the literature, and use
a more elaborate model with seven factors permitting a multitude of endogenous relations be-
tween them. As a result our model achieves a high statistical determination, and we are able to
unravel the character of multiple direct and indirect effects more thoroughly.
Based on the evolution of the aforementioned series, we observe that business cycles have
become more synchronized in the EU, and especially since the introduction of the common
currency. Co-movements are more pronounced in the EA11, EU15 and Core Vs Periphery
than those between the EU15 and the newEU12 countries, however, in the latter groups we
also observe an increasing trend in business cycle synchronization. Trade integration and FDI
linkages have increased strikingly in EU27 in the period of concern. Nevertheless, trade and
FDI integration are by far the most advanced in the core of the EU. Differences in government
deficits have declined substantially in the EU27, but have increased in the EU15. Exchange
rate volatility has also significantly declined. After an early period of de-specialization in the
manufacturing sector, we observe a modest but steady increase in manufacturing specialization
in the whole EU. Income differences have constantly declined in the EU27 attributable to the
catching up in the new member states. In the EU15, income differences have increased slightly.
Turning to our estimation results from the system of simultaneous equations we conclude
that trade, FDI and specialization have, in general, a positive effect on the synchronization of
business cycles in the EU. We find also clear evidence that exchange rate fluctuations and income
disparities inhibit synchronization of business cycles. In addition, diverging government fiscal
policies impede business cycle synchronization in general. Due to its trade enhancing effect, FDI
has a positive net effect on business cycle synchronization across all EU samples.
Since our results show that intra-EU trade concentrates largely on equally developed mem-
bers, and that more trade reduces income disparities, less developed EU countries need to watch
the development of trade linkages if they wish to be suitable EMU members. The results also
suggest that weaker EU members can develop their trade relations if they host intermediary
product FDI. This type of FDI serves the periphery to achieve BCS.
Unlike most of the literature, we find that increasing manufacturing specialization does not
harm BCS, rather the opposite is true. We observe that specialization in the EU27 and in the
Euro Area has recently increased sharply between equally developed countries, promoting trade.
This type of specialization leads to complementary productions and is compatible with more
correlated business cycles. The importance of specialization as business cycle determinant is
nevertheless minor compared to other factors.
The coordination of monetary policies and the introduction of the Euro have to be consid-
ered as an important source for BCS in the EU and in particular in the EU15. However, in
the case of the EU15–newEU12 country pairs this does not necessarily apply. Here exchange
rate flexibility between new and incumbent EU members has to be considered as a necessary
adjustment mechanism to stabilize diverging growth. In our system of simultaneous equations
model we can also explain the source of exchange rate volatility, namely, poor synchronization of
business cycles, sector-specific effects, differentials in inflation rates and government deficits. In
these cases, exchange rate flexibility is required. Since this is strong evidence that, under poor
business cycle synchronization, a common exchange rate policy is not feasible, EU countries with
these characteristics should not be seriously considered as close EMU candidates. The results
also suggest that Euro members with substantial deficits and inflation differentials will see an
increasing pressure for individual exchange rate policy.
The decline in differences in budgetary deficits in the EU27 has promoted business cycle
convergence. EU countries with substantially different fiscal policies can achieve BCS and thus
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qualify for EMU membership through compliance with the deficit convergence criteria. This ad-
vocates a regime of stringent fiscal policy coordination to guarantee the degree of BCS sufficient
for the smooth operation of a common monetary policy. The results obtained in our system of
simultaneous equations further show that, differences in public deficits in the EU are linked to
differences in income and government efficiency. Thus particularly poorer EU members have to
be supported to improve budgetary processes and efficiency of government operations.
Finally, we find clear evidence that income convergence has promoted business cycle con-
vergence in the EU27. Thus the EU has to face the fact that big income differences among its
members are not compatible with a monetary union. Income convergence in turn has benefit-
ted from trade integration policy. In contrast, mounting disparities in government deficits and
austerity policies endanger income convergence.
In summary, some major policy implication arise from this study. First, the EU needs to
broaden the entry/convergence criteria to EMU. Second, beyond the present indicators, also the
extent of trade and FDI linkages, sectoral specialization, institutional differences and income
differences in general need to be considered. Third, compliance with these criteria needs to be
supervised permanently and not only in the pre-entry stage in order to guarantee business cycle
synchronization in the Eurozone that is essential for a viable Euro. Forth, the EU has to strictly
enforce the SGP, but at the same time needs to develop fiscal policy instruments which can
provide adjustment to individual EMU members. Ironically such points were already made in
the planning stage of the Euro.14
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Figure 1: Correlations of HP filtered real GDP (5-year rolling windows, group mean)
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Figure 2: Bilateral trade intensity (5-year rolling windows, group mean)
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Figure 3: Bilateral FDI intensity (5-year rolling window, group mean)
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Figure 4: Bilateral differences in government budget balance (5-year averages, group mean)
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Figure 5: Bilateral exchange rate volatility (5-year rolling window, group mean)
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Figure 6: Bilateral sectoral dissimilarity (specialization; 5-year averages, group mean)
26
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
EU27 EU15‐newEU12 EU15 EA11 Core Vs Periphery
Figure 7: Bilateral per capita income differences (5-year averages, group mean)
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Table 1: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
CORRYijt Fisher’s z transformation of correlations of annualized quarterly Authors’ calculations
HP filtered log real GDP series between country i and j: based on EUROSTAT data
CORRYijt =
1
2
log(
1+CORRY Yijt
1−CORRY Yijt )
TRADEijt Sum of exports and imports (in Euros) of country i to country j Authors’ calculations
divided by the sum of country’s i and j GDP (in Euros) at based on COMEXT,
market prices IMF DOTS and
EUROSTAT data
FDIijt Sum of outward position from country i to j and from country Authors’ calculations
j to i divided by the sum of GDP in country i and j based on EUROSTAT,
UNCTAD, OECD IDIS and
National Bank Statistics data
GOVDEFijt Absolute difference of budget deficit (as a share of GDP) between Authors’ calculations based
country i and j on EUROSTAT and CIA
Factbook data
EXCHijt Annual standard deviation of quarterly first difference bilateral Authors’ calculations based
log exchange rates between country i and j on IMF-IFS data
INFLijt Absolute difference of annual average of quarterly inflation rate Authors’ calculations based
between country i and j on IMF-IFS data
LINTijt Absolute difference of annual average of quarterly differentials Authors’ calculations based
of 10-year government bond yields between country i and j on IMF-IFS and EUROSTAT
data
SINTijt Absolute difference of annual average of quarterly differentials Authors’ calculations based
of money market rate between country i and j on IMF-IFS and EUROSTAT
data
SPECijt The industrial specialisation index is computed using gross value Authors’ calculations based
added disaggregated on the 23 branches of the UNIDO industry on UNIDO data
sectors (ISIC 2 digit, Rev.3). The specialisation index for
country i and j is defined as follows: SPECijt =
∑N
n=1 |skit − skjt|
skit is the share of sector k in country i and skjt is the share
of sector k in country j. The index ranges from 0 to 2. A value
equal to 0 indicates complete similarity of industrial structure,
and a value equal 2 indicates total specialisation.
WAGEijt Absolute difference of log of monthly wage (in current Euros) Authors’ calculations based
between country i and j on LABORSTA, UNIDO
and IMF-IFS data
SGDPijt Sum of log of real GDP (in billion Euros) in country i and j Authors’ calculations based
on WDI World Bank data
DGPDPCijt Absolute difference of log of real GDP per capita between country Authors’ calculations based
i and j on WDI World Bank data
DOMCREDijt Absolute difference of domestic credit to private sector Authors’ calculations based
(as a share of GDP) between i and j on WDI World Bank data
POLijt Political Stability & Absence of Violence/Terrorism (0-10 index) Authors’ calculations based
differential between country i and j in absolute terms on WGI data
ACCijt Democratic Accountability (0-10 index) differential between country Authors’ calculations based
i and j in absolute terms on WGI data
GOV EFFijt Government Effectiveness (0-10 index) differential between country Authors’ calculations based
i and j in absolute terms on WGI data
REGijt Regulatory Quality (0-10 index) differential between country Authors’ calculations based
i and j in absolute terms on WGI data
ROLijt Rule of Law (0-10 index) differential between country i and j Authors’ calculations based
in absolute terms on WGI data
CORRUPTijt Control of Corruption (0-10 index) differential between country Authors’ calculations based
i and j in absolute terms on WGI data
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Table 3: Country groupings
EU27 EU15 newEU12 EA11 Corec Vs Peripheryp
1 AUT AUT BGR AUT AUTc
2 BEL BEL CYP BEL BELc
3 BGR DNK CZE FIN FINc
4 CYP FIN EST FRA FRAc
5 CZE FRA HUN GER GERc
6 DNK GER LVA IRL GRCp
7 EST GRC LTU ITA IRLp
8 FIN IRL MLT LUX ITAp
9 FRA ITA POL NED LUXc
10 GER ROM PRT PRT NEDc
11 GRC LUX SVK ESP PRTp
12 HUN PRT SVN ESPp
13 IRL ESP
14 ITA SWE
15 LVA UK
16 LTU
17 LUX
18 MLT
19 NED
20 POL
21 PRT
22 ROM
23 SVK
24 SVN
25 ESP
26 SWE
27 UK
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Simultaneous Equations, EU27, EU15 and EU15-newEU12
EU27 EU15 EU15-newEU12
1995-2012 1995-2012 1995-2012
CORRY
FDI −4.5353∗∗∗ (0.7281) −11.4177∗∗∗ (0.9027) −0.0281 (4.225)
TRADE 1.9093∗∗∗ (0.1278) 2.9258∗∗∗ (0.1982) 0.8222∗∗ (0.4060)
GOVDEF −2.1033∗∗∗ (0.3497) 0.9597 (0.6651) −8.0795∗∗∗ (0.5149)
EXCH −2.5023∗∗∗ (0.9308) −37.6312∗∗∗ (4.3460) 1.0827 (1.2669)
SPEC 0.5125∗∗∗ (0.0221) 0.6643∗∗∗ (0.0437) 0.0341 (0.0421)
DGDPPC −0.0692∗∗∗ (0.0280) −0.0531 (0.1230) −0.0797∗ (0.0432)
SGDPPC 0.1220∗∗∗ (0.0109)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.2292 0.4161 0.2066
FDI
CORRY −0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0003) −0.0085∗∗∗ (0.0008) −0.0001 (0.0001)
TRADE 0.1644∗∗∗ (0.0016) 0.2155∗∗∗ (0.0032) 0.0831∗∗∗ (0.0013)
SPEC 0.0020∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0108∗∗∗ (0.0014) 0.0015∗∗∗ (0.0001)
DGDPPC 0.0023∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0319∗∗∗ (0.0037) −0.0016∗∗∗ (0.0002)
WAGE −0.0041∗∗∗ (0.0003) −0.0139∗∗∗ (0.0011) −0.0003∗∗ (0.0001)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.5036 0.6790 0.4469
TRADE
CORRY 0.0260∗∗∗ (0.0016) 0.0517∗∗∗ (0.0034) 0.0044∗∗∗ (0.0010)
EXCH −0.1191 (0.0755) −0.4704 (0.3794) −0.2375∗∗∗ (0.0493)
SPEC 0.0313∗∗∗ (0.0021) 0.0447∗∗∗ (0.0054) −0.0038∗∗∗ (0.0013)
FDI 5.0507∗∗∗ (0.0502) 4.1321∗∗∗ (0.0667) 9.0385∗∗∗ (0.1371)
DGDPPC −0.0369∗∗∗ (0.0040) −0.1039∗∗∗ (0.0158) 0.0301∗∗∗ (0.0020)
REG −0.0037∗∗∗ (0.0015) −0.0027∗∗∗ (0.0004)
ROL 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0006)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.5629 0.7322 0.5209
SPEC
TRADE 0.1488∗∗ (0.0582) 0.2493∗∗∗ (0.0837) 2.1732∗∗∗ (0.2957)
FDI 0.5859∗ (0.3255) 1.5663∗∗∗ (0.3738) 22.1978∗∗∗ (3.1358)
REG −0.0134∗∗∗ (0.0041) 0.0254∗∗∗ (0.0082)
ACC 0.0070∗∗ (0.0035) 0.0292∗∗∗ (0.0088) 0.1035∗∗∗ (0.0046)
POL 0.0989∗∗∗ (0.0062)
SGDPPC 0.1657∗∗∗ (0.0018) 0.1276∗∗∗ (0.0033)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.8857 0.8882 0.6943
GOVDEF
CORRY 0.0069∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0068∗∗∗ (0.0008) −0.0082∗∗∗ (0.0008)
DGDPPC 0.0522∗∗∗ (0.0017) 0.1189∗∗∗ (0.0046) 0.0519∗∗∗ (0.0023)
LINT −0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0035∗∗∗ (0.0005) −0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001)
GOVEFF 0.0034∗∗∗ (0.0003) 0.0046∗∗∗ (0.0004) 0.0009∗∗ (0.0004)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.5266 0.6308 0.6282
EXCH
CORRY −0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.0007∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0002)
GOVDEF 0.0122∗∗∗ (0.0026) −0.0061 (0.0042) 0.0163∗∗∗ (0.0036)
DGDPPC 0.0007∗∗∗ (0.0002) −0.0032∗∗∗ (0.0007) 0.0021∗∗∗ (0.0003)
SPEC 0.0038∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.0028∗∗∗ (0.0002) 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0002)
INFL 0.0488∗∗∗ (0.0006) 0.0807∗∗∗ (0.0121) 0.0520∗∗∗ (0.0006)
SINT 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0008∗∗∗ (0.0001)
DOMCRED 0.0018∗∗∗ (0.0002)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.8774 0.4569 0.8888
DGDPPC
TRADE −0.3695∗∗∗ (0.0413) 0.0113 (0.0217) 1.5899∗∗∗ (0.1347)
GOVDEF 8.8835∗∗∗ (0.1493) 3.9428∗∗∗ (0.1146) 3.2579∗∗∗ (0.1385)
FDI −8.9879∗∗∗ (1.4270)
POL 0.0652∗∗∗ (0.0027) 0.0114∗∗∗ (0.0021)
ROL 0.1124∗∗∗ (0.0037)
CORRUPT 0.0901∗∗∗ (0.0220)
N 4550 1274 2352
R2 0.5764 0.5541 0.9185
Country fixed-effects YES YES YES
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES
Country-specific
time trends YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level,
respectively. All estimations with time specific effects.
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Table 5: Estimation Results of Simultaneous Equations, EA11 and Core Vs Periphery
EA11 Core Vs Per
2001-2012 2001-2012
CORRY
FDI −19.9387∗∗∗ (1.4943) −20.9946∗∗∗ (2.1937)
TRADE 3.9611∗∗∗ (0.3167) 6.1450∗∗∗ (0.6247)
GOVDEF −2.2389∗∗ (1.0901) −3.6078∗∗∗ (1.1527)
SPEC 0.7272∗∗∗ (0.0762) 0.2604∗∗ (0.1106)
DGDPPC 1.1978∗∗∗ (0.2246) 1.9732∗∗∗ (0.2541)
N 360 240
R2 0.6092 0.5813
FDI
CORRY −0.0160∗∗∗ (0.0014) −0.0143∗∗∗ (0.0015)
TRADE 0.2061∗∗∗ (0.0046) 0.2674∗∗∗ (0.0114)
SPEC 0.0213∗∗∗ (0.0025) 0.0009 (0.0031)
DGDPPC 0.0845∗∗∗ (0.0071) 0.0846∗∗∗ (0.0085)
WAGE −0.0229∗∗∗ (0.0019) −0.0166∗∗∗ (0.0029)
N 360 240
R2 0.7978 0.5869
TRADE
CORRY 0.0872∗∗∗ (0.0067) 0.0520∗∗∗ (0.0047)
SPEC 0.0253∗∗ (0.0108) 0.0876∗∗∗ (0.0084)
FDI 4.5068∗∗∗ (0.1090) 2.9442∗∗∗ (0.1364)
DGDPPC −0.2398∗∗∗ (0.0333) −0.1739∗∗∗ (0.0232)
REG −0.0130∗∗∗ (0.0033) −0.0133∗∗∗ (0.0028)
N 360 240
R2 0.8087 0.7368
SPEC
TRADE 0.0346 (0.1250) 1.8061∗∗∗ (0.2235)
FDI 1.4543∗∗ (0.5869) −2.5980∗∗∗ (0.8664)
POL −0.0254∗∗∗ (0.0076) −0.0221∗∗ (0.0088)
ACC 0.1128∗∗∗ (0.0152) 0.1065∗∗∗ (0.0149)
SGDPPC 0.1477∗∗∗ (0.0059) 0.1147∗∗∗ (0.0075)
N 360 240
R2 0.9177 0.9164
GOVDEF
CORRY −0.0001 (0.0019) −0.0074∗∗∗ (0.0028)
DGDPPC 0.0897∗∗∗ (0.0099) 0.1236∗∗∗ (0.0131)
LINT 0.0170∗∗∗ (0.0018) 0.0074∗∗∗ (0.0012)
GOVEFF 0.0049∗∗∗ (0.0010) 0.0041∗∗∗ (0.0012)
N 360 240
R2 0.6201 0.6524
DGDPPC
TRADE −0.2398∗∗∗ (0.0658) −0.2707∗∗ (0.1365)
GOVDEF 2.0989∗∗∗ (0.1909) 2.3881∗∗∗ (0.2340)
FDI 1.8711∗∗∗ (0.3293) 2.0172∗∗∗ (0.5395)
ROL 0.0365∗∗∗ (0.0036) 0.0356∗∗∗ (0.0043)
N 360 240
R2 0.6184 0.6812
Country fixed-effects YES YES
Time fixed-effects YES YES
Country-specific
time trends YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level,
respectively. All estimations with time specific effects.
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